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Chile enjoys a better  formal legal and regulatory  environment
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Drawing on the new institutional economics,  the costs that would otherwise have been im-
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and compare their costs with those of Chile's  have evolved to transform the process of regis-
institutions, which are relatively simple.  tering a new business from a potentially tortur-
ous obstacle path into a fairly affordable one-
They examine four basic areas where legal  stop process. Ir debt collection, information
and regulatory institutions could create critical  systems limit the need to resort to the formal
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of Sao Paulo and Santiago:
'Tonetheless, regulation - in the form of
* The start-up of a new business (entry).  complex and resource-intensive tax rules,
regulatory processes, and conflict-resolution
* The regulation of business.  mechanisms - raises the cost of transactions for
Brazilian businesses. Costs are further raised by
* Orders by customers of garment firms.  greater uncertainty and frequent renegotiation of
orders. So, overall, the environment for business
* Sales with credit.  in Brazil is less favorable than that in Chile.
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AIMSTRACT  This  paper  draws  on the new  institutional  economics  to examine  the impact  on businesses
of Brazil's  relatively  complex  and non-transparent  legal  and regulatory  institutions  and compares  their
costs  to those  of the relatively  simple  institutions  in Chile.  It examines  four  basic  areas  where  legal  and
regulatory  institutions  could  create  critical  obstacles  to efficiency  in the garment  industries  of Sao  Paulo
and Santiago:  the start  up of a new  business  (entry);  the regulation  of business;  orders  by  customers  of
garment  firms;  and  sales  with  credit.  The results  show  that  Chilean  business  transactions  indeed  benefit
om  legal  simplicity  and consistency  of enforcement  relative  to their Brazilian  counterparts,  but thesw
benefits  are mitigated  by  the differences  between  formal  law  and  the law  in practice  in BraziL  In two  of
the four areas  examined,  Brazil  has  evolved  some  effective  institutional  substitutes  to reduce  the costs
that would  otherwise  have been imposed  by inefficient  formal  institutions. In the entry of new
businesses,  professions  have  evolved  to transform  the process  of registering  a business  from  a potentially
tortuous  obstacle  trail  into a fairly  affordable  one stop  process. n debt  collection,  information  systems
limit  resort  to the formal  legal  system.  In the remaining  two  areas,  the existence  of substitutes  does  not
bring  transactions  costs  down  to the level  of Chile.  Brailian businesses  confront  high  transactions  costs
in  regulation,  through  more  complex  and  resource  intensive  regulatoryprocesses  and  conflict  resolution
mechanisms. In orders, greater uncertainty  and frequent renegotiation  raise costs. Overall,  the
environment  for business  In Brazil  is  inferior  to that in Chile. Yet, even  with these  costs,  the findings
warn  against  a preoccupation  with  formal  legal  and  regulatory  reform  as  an immediate  means  to promote
economic  development;  in  the eyes  of Brazilian  enterpreneurs,  problems  relating  to legal  and  regulatory
institutions  tak- a distinct  back  scat to macroeconomic  and political  instability.
1.  INTRODUCflON
How  do complex,  nontransparent  laws  and  regulations,  and  a somewhat  inaccessible,  expensive
and  slow  set  of formal  legal  conflict  resolution  mechanisms  affect  business  transactions?  This  study  uses
the approach  of the new  institutional  economics  (NIE) to contrast  the impact  of the complex  legal  and
regulatory  environment  in Brazil  with  that in Chile,  where  regulatory  and legal  reforms  have  sought  to
facilitate  market efficiency.  Additionally,  the study  examines  the importance  of legal and regulatory
obstacles  to the growth  and  operation  of Brazilian  businesses  relative  to other constraints.  The results
illustrate  a central  point:  institutions  matter economically  in the actual  costs  (and  benefits)  they  create
for businesses,  not in their compliance  with  ideal  forms.2
The study  examines four basic  areas where legal and regulatory institutions could  create critical
obstacles to efficiency:
*  the start up of a new businesses (entry);
*  the regulation of business:
*  orders by  customers; and
sales with credit.
The first two areas involve  transactions between a business  and the government, while  the second two
involve transactions between businesses.  Interviews with garment firms were used to  learn in as
quantitative a way as possible the costs and problems associated with particular transactions.
The results show that Chilean business transactions indeed benefit from legal simplicity  and
consistency  of enforcement relative to their Brazilian  counterparts, but these benefits are mitigated by
the differences between formal law and the law in practice in Brazil. In two of the four areas examined,
Brazil has evolved  some effective institutional substitutes  to reduce the costs  that would otherwise have
been imposed  by inefficient formal institutions. In the entry of new businesses,  professions  have evolved
to transform the process of registering a business  from a potentially tortuous obstacle trail into a fairly
affordable one stop process.  In debt collection, information systems  obviate the need for use of the
formal  legal system  in the vast majority  of cases. In the remaining  two areas, the existence  of substitutes
does not bring transactions costs down to  the level of Chile. Brazilian businesses confront high
transactions  costs in regulation, through more complex  and resource intensive regulatory processes  and
conflict resolution; and in oram  .hrough greater uncertainty and frequent renegotiation.  The net
combination of these effects im. ljes a somewhat  inferior environment for business in Brazil.
Yet, even with these costs. our findings warn against a preoccupation with formal legal and
regulatory reform as an immediate means to pro.aote economic developmenL The relative ranking of
obstacles to growth perceived by  Brazilian  entrepreneurs makes  clear that problems  relating to legal  and
regulatory institutions take  a distinct back seat  to  macroeconomic instability, and  that  Federal
government  economic  policy  imposes  greater insecurity  on property rights  than any  regulatoryor judicial
institutional weakness. Once uncertainty of policy  and prices has been addressed, an agenda of labor3
and tax regulatory simplification  predominates. Only then do the obstacles imposed by defects directly
tied to the formal legal system emerge as binding  constraints on businesses.
2. SOME METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
This section scmmarizes some of the theoretical controversies that motivated the research,
clarifies the reasons why Brazil and Chile were selected as targets of study, and outlines how the field
surveys  were organized.
Formalisticversus  New  Institutional  Approaches Ideally,  amarketeconomydevelopsinstitutions
(including  markets, contracts, firms of various characteristics,  and systems  of regulation) that allow  the
highest value to be attaSned from its resources. 2 Traditionally, neoclassical  economics has assumed
such institutions to be in place, and consequently that transactions between buyers and sellers are
costless, instantaneous  and  based on  perfect  information. 3 Two distinct, but  related, literatures
incre  asingly  have begun to explore deviations from this ideal.
Ile  field of "Law and Development"  holds that rapid market-based e-onomic growth depends
on: a system  of simple,  transparent laws  and regulations;  consistent interpretation and enforcement (ike
cases are treated alike); just and rapid resolution of conflicts (justice deferred is justice denied); and a
social  attitude of respect for legal and regulatory institutions. 4 The common law  systems  of England and
the United States, as well as the civil legal systems  of Western European countries are taken as ideals. 5
Deviations from the ideal obstruct development. The best known recent example is the discussion  in
Hemando de Soto's The Other Path of the costs of starting a business  in Lima, Peru.  De Soto finds
complex, strangling Peruvian law and regulation to be a powerful disincentive to formality, hence a
stimulus  for the rise of a large informal sector unprotected by formal law. 6 De Soto's work stands out
in its careful observation of the many effects of the legal and regulatory system on the poor and its
attempt to document the costs of doing things "by  the book".' The Law and Development literature is
prescriptive in its conclusions:  societies that  are not  ruled by transparent  laws and consistent
enforcement should be.
The New Institutional Economics  (ME) has also observed the divergence  of law  and regulation
from an ideal: that of the neoclassical  economic model. NIE began with an emphasis on the proper4
definition and enforcement of property rights, 8 but has evolved to look at the impact of institutions on
the cost of transactions. According  to Williamson  [1990J,  transactions cost economics recognizes that
the definition, comprehension, and enforcement by courts of property rights are all problematic.
Therefore,  non-market social institutions arise to provide 'contractual integrity for transactions."
Transactions costs economics, unlike the Law and Development literature, recognizes that formal law
and courts do not and cannot, alone, resolve contractual problems relating to transactions:
Transaction cost economics  is  specifically  concerned with the governance of contractual
relations (by markets, hierarchies,  and by  hybrid modes) and rejects the proposition that
the courts can administer  justice in an informed, low  cost, and eEcacious way. Rather
than place the principal burden of contract enforcement on the courts, it argues instead
that court ordering operates in the background role and that private ordering by the
parties is the principal contractual arena.  Thus...transaction cost economics focuses
expressly on the comparative efficacy  with which alternative governance structures
manage transactions during contract execution.e
Transaction cost economics enriches the view of institutions by  weighing  the costs and benefits
of alternative corporate governance structures and other institutions.' 0 Thus while NIE and Law and
Development bear some family resemblance, NEE judges institutional arrangements based on their
empirical impact on the efficiency  of economic transactions, not on their resemblance to rational
Westem norms of law and jurisprudence.  Efficiency  is achieved,  not only tbrough low cost exchanges,
but through the ability  of businesses  to commit assets to a series of transactions  with another business;
a dimension known as asset specificity. Central to efficiency  is the low-cost  availability  of information
needed to evaluate products being exchanged and to police and enforce agreements."  A central
strength of the work of such writers as Douglass North is the recognition that informal institutions
(besides laws  and formal organizations) may  play as important a role in determining the costs of doing
business as formal ones.
The field of NIE is relatively  new, and has only recently begun grappling  with the difficult  task
of measuring transactions costs." This study contributes to the growing literature  devoted to  the
measurement of these costs by  presenting several indicators  of the costs involved  in our four transaction
areas. These indicators allow  both comparisons  between countries and between firms  of different sizes.
The informaiuiii is used to evaluate the relative strengths of Law and Development and NIB  If bad
practice (hence  costly transactions) always accompanies bad law, the formalism of the Law and
Development approach will  prove sufficient. If, however, there are efficient transactions in the absence5
of  good law, then  an  empirical approach  of  measuring the  benefits and  costs of  institutional
arrangements would seem justified.
The legal and regulatoa  environments of Brazil and Chile. Our study was set in two countries
of fundamentaliy  different policy  and institutional environments: one that is highly  interventionist in an
exceptionally  detailed way, and another that has engaged in systematic  reform to reduce the size and
role of government in marLets and to impersonalize the rules of economic competition.  Brazil's
government has traditionally  been heavily  involved in the economy, both through direct ownership of
public  enterprise and through exquisitely  detailed regulation,  subsidy  and taxation  ot the private sector.Y
Rosenn (19841  describes  a system in which laws  are so complex  and couit procedures so expensive  that
formal institutions could not be relied on for dealing  with day to day problems  in regulation and business
transactions.
14 He describes Brazil as a dualistic  system, having  simultaneously  a rigid formal law and,
quite separately, a 'practical system for ordering affairs." Formal law is extraordinarily  specific and is
approved without reference to its consistency  with existing  law. Thus a number of inconsistent laws  may
apply to an otherwise simple  business  transaction, such as the "1,470  separate legal actions with thirteen
government ministries and fifty  agencies"  required for an export license in 1981.  He describes  the use
of the jeito [the fix] as a means of achieving  a degree of simplicity,  common sense and speed (for both
licit and illicit purposes) in a system that is tangled, illogical  and slow. The jeito is a way around the
formal law,  either in the form of an evasion by a private citizen or a sensible accommodation  achieved
with the help of a properly motivated  government official. The despachante,  a professional  go between,
facilitates the  latter  form of jeito, enabling business to  proceed somewhat logically in  a formal
environment  hostile to efficiency.  " While Rosenn decries  the erosion of the power and efficiency  of law,
he ultimately sees advantages to the informal institutions that have evolved. He suggests that these
institutions, while more costly than a more rational formal legal system, allow  business to process with
"stability  and predictability."' 7 Yet, true to the Law  and Development approach, he ultimately  insists  that
the developmental benefits of legal reform towards a system with efficient laws, "a high degree of
obedience to the rule of law, and impersonal, efficient administration of the laws"  justify dramatic
change." 8 While we fully  sympathized  with Rosenn's call for reform, we felt his  claims about the relative
costs and benefits of Brazil's system merited empirical scrutiny.6
Given the complexity  of Brazil's formal law and legal and regulatory processes, we envisioned
several possible states of Brazilian  society. The first possibility,  raised by a literature discussing  elite
power and oligopoly  in Brazil. is that institutional failures have cream  xd  fixed  entry and other costs that
offer advantages to size and reputation.  In this scenario, relationships of trust bridge gaps in legal
institutions,  binding  profitable, larger "insider public  and private institutions together, while  limiting  the
entry and growth of "outsiders' who lack access  to such privileged  relationships.'  A second scenario,
suggested by Rosenn's writing,  is that all businesses  operate under the handicap of an inefficient system
that slows  development and puts Brazilian industry at a competitive disadvantage  with nations having
efficient legal and regulatory systems.  Finally, all firms may have found adequate institutional
substitutes that allow them to operate about as efficiently as compatable firtms  in countries with better
tunctioning  formal institutions. In this case, the major question would center around tne dynamic  effect
of reliance on informal mechanisms (issues raised by North), rather than its consequences for static
efficiency.
Oily a comparison with some other country would allow a clear differentiation between a
scenario of generalized inefficiency from formal institutional failure and one of efficiency through
effective  substitutes. To this end, Chile was  chosen as a country where years of conscious reform aimed
at improving market efficiency began from a base of a complex legal and regulatory environment
comparable to Brazil's.  Besides comprehensive  macroeconomic  reform, Chile has moved to deregulate
the economy,  attempting to rationalize price, tax  and labor regulation and deregulating and privatizing
the financial  sector. 2'  It is now regarded as having  a relatively  well-defined  property rights system  and
a liberal economy.  In dramatic contrast to the image of Brazil, where influence and contacts with
bureaucrats have been portrayed as vital to economic success,=  a recent study finds an environment
where entrepreneurs rank "politician and authority contacts" as the least important of seven factors
determining their success.'
The field surveys.  The parallel studies of Brazil and Chile center on the garment industry  in the
cities of Sao Paulo and Santiago (and environs). The garment sector was  chosen for two reasons. First,
unlike many  other industrial sectors in Brazil,  it was not being specially  promoted by the government.
A recent evaluation showed the clothing and shoe industry to be low in regulatory and promotional7
constraints on  capital mobility and competition, as well as low in the level of  fiscal, credit and
procurement  related  incentives relative  to  all  other  industrial sectors. 24 Thus,  sector-specific
interventions were less likely to cloud the impact of economy-wide  law and regulation on businessesi
Second, the clothing industry has no large, inherent scaie  economies (hence has small,  medium  and large
firms  competing),  enabling the study  of problems  faced by  firms  of a variety  of sizes. Note, however,  that
transactions in the garment sector tend to be short-term, limiting  our abilty to extrapolate from our
findings to the impact of the leg21  system on long-term transactions.
Interviews  were conducted with 42 garment firms in each country.  The sample was  stratified by
size of firm.  The Brazilian  sample comprised 5 largc firms (over 500 employees), 13 medium firms (101
to 500 employees), and 25 small firms (of 100  or fewer employees). Interviews  were also conducted in
Brazil with officials of three textile firms, with three garment subcontractors (not  included in the
sample), as well  as with lawyers.  bankers, despachantes vnd leaders of industly  associations. Ile  Chile
sample comprised  7 large firms,  25 medium firms  and 10  small firms.  The Chilean sample  was stratified
to  attain  ethnic  representation  proportionate  to  that  in  the  population  of  garment  industry
entrepreneurs, as different groups supply different ends of the markeL In both cases, relative to the
population of firms, large and medium firms  were oversampled. A printed questionnaire, highlighting
experiences  and obstacles in the four transaction areas  discussed  below,  was  verbally  administered  byone
of the authors or their assistants directly  to the proprietor or an officer of each firm. 2'  The limited area
of sampling and the relatively small sample size and the small numbers of firms in size categories
responding to certain questions severely limits the ability  to make valid statistical inferences from the
data for the two r.ations under study, but the results here are highly  suggestive  of important areas for
policy  attention.
3. BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT TRANSACTIONS
Business-govemment  transactions shape the costs of going into and staying  in business,  as well
as the level and certainty of returns to investment. Dealings between business and govenament are
inherently  unequal because one party (the govemment) is making  and enforcing the rules that affect the
interests of both.  Hence, lack of transparency in the regulation of entry and operation may inviteopportunistic behavior by officials enforcing the law.  Lack of consistency  in law and admihastratiorn
increases bureaucratic discretion and may  increase opportunities for governmsnt officials  to seek resnts.
Institutional failures may impose costs that restrict competition, distort patverns of investment or of
sales and/or divert entrepreneurial attention from economically  productive activities ,o seeking rents.
Fuirthermore,  these failings  make it hard for businesses  to predict the outcome of investment  decisions.
Yet, as the data will  demonstrate, thei  impact  of institutional  failings  (hence the value  of reform) depends
on the ability  of businesses to fili; substitutes for inefficient formal institutions.
We examine first the impact of the procedures required to start-up a business un entry.
Thereafter we explore the impact on firms of the tax and regulatory requirements associated with
business  operation. Taken together, the evidence on the transactions costs of entry and regulation offer
a surprising insight on the nature of buzsiness  informality.
Entrv-- Access  to Fornality Entry is  a critical point atwhich thecompetitivenessofaneconomy
is determined. Barriers to entry, including large fixed  costs, may  protect those firms already in business
at the expense of newer firms. If new  entrants cu  2mot  afford to become formal, they may  be doomed to
stay small, needing to be invisible  to authorities, hence denied access to capital and most associations
with formal businesses. If even this route is foreclosed, large incumbent firms  will dominate markets.
In 1983  a team from Hernando de Soto's Institute for Liberty and Democracy tried to set up a
small garment firm on the outskirts of Lima. In a now famous experiment, thty followed the formal,
legal process and found that it took them 289 days to fulfill  eleven requirements, $194 in direct costs
(including two bnbes they had to pay, but not including eight they were asked to pay but avoided) and
over $1,000  in foregone profits. Opening a store was relatively simpler, but more expensive, involving
three govemment departments, requiring  43 days,  and costing  $590.56,  or 15  minimum  wages. This high
"cost  of access"  was  identified as a major  contributor to the large number of informal  enterprises in Peru.
De Soto's team did not, how  -ver, examine  the actual  costs incurred by  garment firms  in accessing  formal
status, only the cost and delays of "going by the book."  De Soto suggested that these costs were
important explanations of the large number of small,  informal firms in Lima.
Brazil, too, has about eleven steps required for "access  to formality' in industry, and we asked
businesses about the difficulties  they encountered in becoming formaL Contrary to our expectation9
they had few  complaints. Entry into garment  manufacture  turns out to be a relatively  easy,  one-and-
a-half-month.  one-stop  process  in practice,  though  not  irA  law.
In practice,  most finns enter with a single  payment  to an accountant  or a despachante. On
average,  the numerous  steps  (e.g.  with  federal,  state and local  tax  authorities,  the Ministries  of Industty
and  Fazenda,  the commercial  registry,  the cadastral  authorities,  etc.)  were  completed  by  the A=ountant
within  6 weeks.' The total zost  of entry  was  not insignificant,  with  estimates  varying  from  as  low  as  $150
to as high as $2500,  averaging  around $640. Yet several microenterprise  or small  limited  liability
'morporations  in our sample  had  been  able  to register  for under  $500  in about  a month,I  suggesting  that
the one-time fLxed  cost of entry is not an overvhelming  obstacle to formality. When specifically
questioned  on difricult  steps  of  entrv.  most  firms  reported  no problems.  Accountants  (and  occasionally
despachantes)  have  ,ovided a simple, clear, effective substitute for the govemment's  complex
institutions  of business  entry.:9
TABLE  1:  TMEX  AND)  COST  OF REGISTRATION0
BRAZIL  CHILE
Total  Cost of Registering  $640  $739
(in  U.S. $)  (n-15)  (n-15)
Totel  Time to Register  1.6  2.0
(in  months)  (n-17)  (n-16)
I  . .__  __  __  ___  . -__  _  _  . -__
While $640 and seven weeks may seem high, the Santiago  survey  provides  a surprising
comparison:  the average  cost  of registration  for all firms  was  higher,  and  the average  it time took  time
a bit longer.  For small  firms  the cost  was  lower  than Brazil's,  at $500,  and the mean  time  required  just
over seven  weeks.  For medium-sized  firms,  the mean  cost  reportedly  averaged  over  four  times  as much,
and it took them  over two  months  to register.  Yet, the time  it took them  may  be misleading:  in Chile,
firms  may  start operation  before  the entire registration  process  is  complete.
Overall,  theconclusion  is  that  Brazil  has  neitheranoverwhelminglycostly  noranoverwhelmingly
difficult  entry  process.  (In fact,  the comparison  raises  questions  about  the efficiency  of Chile's  system.)
Sao Paulo's  formal  legal requirements  would  have implied  a much more difficult  process  than the
procedure  in practice.  Only  actual  measurement  reve.als  the moderate  cost  of registration  in BraziL10
Regulatior.  Regulation and bureaucratic red tape are often identified as one of the worst
products of inefficient government institutions. Excessive  regulation may  create a generalized drag on
all businesses  or may  favor some kinds of businesses  over others, either as an intended consequence of
implementation, or as a result of the structure of costs imposed  by regulation. Poor regulation not only
adds to the costs  of doing business,  but also increases  uncertainty about the returns from investments  and
individual  transactions. Finally,  if regulation imposes  transaction-specific  risks  or costs,  it may  encourage
companies to vertically integrate  into retailing or inrut  production as a way of avoiding market
transactions.
At first glance, it would seem impossib'e for Brazilian firms to contend with the mass of
contradictory, rapidly changing, and unknowable law that is the formal reality with which they are
confronted. Brazilian  garment firms .dentified the regulations and enforcement practices  surrounding
federal taxes, the state  value added tax (ICMS) and labor regulations as the most vexing of their
regulatory burdens."  Entrepreneurs detailed a set of over 50 federal, state and municipal taxes they
must pay,  some of which require monthly contributions. Thus, for taxes alone, firms must comply  with
over 50 sets of filing and payment requirements with inconsistent record-keeping demands.  A typical
sale requires the filing  of rour or more copies  of the "nota fiscale"  or sales fonn. Beyond this, the lack  of
clarity in and the changeable nature of tax and other law makes  compliance difficult  and opportunistic
manipulation of law by rent-seeking bureaucrats relatively  easy. The tax and regulatory burden is said
by several entrepreneurs to double the cost of garments sold formally.
Our goal was to learn how firms  contended with this complex  regulatory system  in practice, and
at what cost.  While it is hard to measure directly the costs that regulation imposes on individual
transactions, we collected information (summarized  in Figures 1 and 2, and Table 2) on three types of
costs to firms  associated with regulation: the usage and cost of external accountants; the proportion of
proprieters' time spent complying  with regulations;  and the amount of employees time devoted to tasks
of compliance. This enables us to compare costs  between Brazil and Chile, to get a relative sense of the
burden on business  of Brazil's unreformed system, as it exists in practice.
As Table 2 suiariarizes, small  Brazilian  firms  generally  hire an outside accountant to handle their
taxes at an average cost of $525 per month, with a range from $91 to over $2000. Figure 2 shows  us whyFigure  1







t  t  :::.  ^  ~~~~~~5%  4.9%
%  Proprietor's  Time  %  Employee.'  Time
1  9  Large  El  Medium  D Small  All Enterprses
20%





....  ......  ~.  4%  .7  4
0% 
%  Propdetors  Time  %  Employees'  TimeFigure  2












0  20  40  60  80  100  120
Number  of Employees
Brazil  Chile o.  .l11
medium  and large firms  internalize  these functions  -- once they grow beyond  50 to 60 employees,
contracting  out becomes  too expensive,  and a full time person is needed to focus  on the complex
requirements  of a larger firm  (although  some  firms  hire external  auditors  to assist  in compliance  with
ever-changing  regulations).  This may  be due to tougher  enforcement  by government  officials  of tax
regulations  (including  payroll  taxes)  against  larger firms,  as well  as to labor regulations  that apply  to
larger  firms.  In addition,  the rewards  to scrutiny  may  be greater  for officials  in the case  of firms  with  60
or more  employees.
TABLE 2:  USE AND  COST OF' EXTERNAL  ACCOUNTANTS
BRAZIL  CHILE
SMALL  MEDIUM  LARGE  ALL  SMALL MEDIUM LARGE  ALL
X  Using  an  I  I
Accountant  96X  15%  201  61%  70%  52%  57%  571
Monthly  Cost  1
Accountant  515  5806  n.a.  n.a.  $126  $409  $1313 $400
(U.S.  $)  ____  __________________-
In addition to using  outside consultants,  Brazilian  proprietors of small  and medium  firms devote
an average  of nearly  15%  of their time to regulatory  compliance  activities.  For the largest  firms,  the
function requires  whole departments.  and becomes  a specialized  management  function,  hence an
accurate  measure  of managerial  time  spent  was  too complicated  for  respondents  to quickly  estimate.  In
addition  to top management's  time, between  4% (for medium  firms)  and 7% (for large firms)  of
employees'  time (an average  of 3.75 full time employees  for small and medium  firms)  is spent on
activities  related  to compliance  with  government  regulations.
In sharp contrast  to Brazil.  the most  striking  feature of Chilean  responses  was  the number  of
entrepreneurs  who  had  no complaints  about  the  government.  The most  frequent  response  to a question
about the public  agency that created the most  difficulties  was "none"  (22.5%  of responses,  40% for small
firms). The common  response  was: "If  you pay  your  taxes,  there is nothing  to worry  about." 24%  of
respondents  said  that  their proprietors  or senior  managers  spent  between  zero  and  one percent  of their
time dealing  with  bureaucracy.  31%  of respondents  required  the equivalent  of between  zero  and  one
teph  of one full time employee  to comply  with government  bureaucracy.  While  complaints  were12
registered about the Tax Revenue service, municipal  building  permits and taxes, and labor regula.ions,
responses indicated a much higher level  of contentment.  Turning to the specific cost measures,
while the majority of Chilean firms use external accounting secivces, the average cost -- at $335 per
month - is only 63% of that of their Brazilian  counterparts.  In particular, small firms in Chile pay an
average of onlyS1Ill  a month for their accountingservices,  while  Brazilian  small  firms  average a payment
of $515 ($428, omitting one outlier).  This implies that the minimum  fixed accounting-related cost of
operation -a  necessary  burden for all businesses  that choose to enter as formal firms  -- is  lower in Chile.
Additionally,  there is a much  weaker relationship in Chile between the use of an extemal accountant and
the size of the firm, implying that, other things being cqual, there is no size at which government-
demanded records become too complex  or expensive  for an external agent to handle. 57% of large firms
use external accountants, paying  them an average of $934 per month.
Chilean entrepreneurs spend somewhat  less  of their own time contending with the requirements
of  government  bureaucracy  --  10% as  compared  with  15% for  their  Brazilian counterparts.
Furthermore, whereas for Brazil the heaviest burden on proprietor's time falls  on small  enterprise, the
re,glulatory  burden is lightest for the smallest Chilean firms,  whose proprietors spend an average of only
6% of their time contending with govemment, again evidencing  lower barriers to entry. An even more
striking  difference lies in the staff time required for compliance: the average Chilean firm  requires the
equivalent of only two thirds of one full time employee to deal with bureaucracy and government
requirements,  as  opposed to an average  of over 3.75  full time equivalents  for small  and medium  Brazilian
firms. 32
In addition to differences in the regulatory  costs associated with everyday  operation, Brazilian
and Chilean firms also differ in the prevalence of disputes vwith  government officials and in the way in
which they are resolved. Brazil's complex regulatory environment creates a high level of conflict for
medium and larger firms. There was a general feeling among businesses that agents of bureaucracy
"could  always  find something  wrong."  As Figure 3a shows,  two thirds of the Brazilian  firms  surveyed  have
disagreed with a government official and attempted to have a ruling changed, with the proportion
highest for large firms. Further, Brazil's medium and large firms are more prone than their smaller
counterparts to use formal appeals processes  and lawsuits  to resolve  conflicts  with government agencies,Figure  3
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with 70%o  of medium firms sampled,  and 100%  of large firms, resorting to formal legal appeal or lawsuit
at some time.  Legal action defers payment of fines and tax assessments and creates a lengthy perod
in which a settlement can be negotiated. Furthermore, those who had used formal appeals mechanisms
and lawsuits were not discouraged  by them: 81% of those who had pursued these means said theyvyould
do so again."
In marked contrast to the Brazil response, only 28% of the firms in Santiago had taken action
regarding a disagreement with a government agency.  Unlike Brazil, there was no suggestion by
entrepreneurs that informal payments form a systematic  substitute for well-functioning  regulatory and
conflict  resolution mechanisms.3 Like Brazil,  a higher proportion of small  firms used informal conflict
resolution mechanisms than larger firms (see  Figure 3b).  Unlike Brazil. small firm  showed no
disinclination  to use formal appeals processes. compared to larger firms. 3'  Yet there was no indication
of lawsuits  against the govemment. As in Brazil, it was large firns who were most likely to act upon a
disagreement with an agency  decision. Overal, Chilean firms clearly  bear lower compliance costs and
experience less conflict with government officials
Cumulatively,  the effect of regulation in Brazil - but not in Chile - is to create a threshold
beyond which firms face sharply increased regulatory costs.  Table 3 details the average scores of
respondents as to  the burden of three  types of regulations relative to other  constraints on  their
expansion,  with a score of zero for the least binding  constraint, and a score of one for the most binding
(section 5 of the paper discusses  the overall constraint results in more detail). No systematic  variation
by firm size is evident for Chilean firms. By contrast, the scores suggest  that Brazilian firms confront a
'threshold burden':'  the scores are lowest for th._  smallest firm  rise as firm  size increases,  but decline
again for the largest  size group. Consistent  with the evidence presented earlier, a plausible  explanation
for this pattern  is that regulatory enforcement is higher for medium firms than for their smaler
counterparts.
It follows  that firms may  rationally  limit expansion as a way  of remaining below the regulatory
threshold. Indeed, in the course of interviews,  we commonly  encountered the 'multiple business  card
phenomenon:  rather than growing  big, entrepreneurs expand into multiple small businesses,  each of
which  can carry  on substantial informal activity.  Hence they must fish through their pockets to produce14
the correct card for the business  one is  discussing.  Trhe  sharp increase in regulatory obstacles to medium
fin.s  (and the modest decline for large ones)  suggests that  large incumbents may be somewhat
protected from the appearance of new large competitors.
TABLE 3:  THE BURDEN  OF REGULATCRY  CONSTRAINTS  BY FIRM SIZE
(Normalized  Level  of Difficulty  on a Zero to  One Scale)
..Il  FIRM SIZE
Less  than  |  25-99  100-499  500  or  more
__  25  employees  Employees Employees  Employees
IA:  BRAZIL  _  _
tTax  Bureaucracy  0.50  0.54  0.69  0.65
Labor  Regulations  0.47  0.66  0.70  0.56
Other  Bureaucratic  ||
Procedures  fl  0.28  0.38  0.53  0.40
B:  CHILE  I  _  . _
Tax  Bureaucracy  l  a/  0.28  0.28  0.28
Labor  Regulations  a/  0.28  0.46  |  0.41
Other  Bureaucratic  |
Procedures  a/  0.43  0.31  |  0.33
Note:  v Only  one firm  with fewer than 25 employees  was interviewed  in Chile; it is included in the 25-
29 employee caterory
The nature of informality.  Taken together, the analyses of entry and regulation point to an
interpretation of informality that is rather different from that propounded by Hemando De Soto.
Whereas De Soto attributes informality  to the high  cost of becoming formal,  our findings  focus  attention
instead on the ongoing regulatory and tax-related costs of operating as a formal enterprise. Further,
contrary to the picture of a choice between unregistered informality and registered formality,  our
analysis  suggests  a more complex reality.
In both Sao Paulo and Santiago, we did not find unregistered firms.  Efforts to track down
"informal"  firms in Sao Paulo inevitably  led to the discovery  of a formally  registered firm  that conducted15
a certain amount of informal -- "off the books' -- activity  (although anecdotal evidence suggested that
there might  well be concentrated pockets of unregistered businesses  elsewhere in Sao Paulo State and
near Rio de Janeiro).  The overall evidence from the  two cities studied indicated that, for those
entrepreneurs deciding to start a garment business, the costs of formal legal status do not outweigh its
benefits.  Hence,  informality in  garment  manufacture  is  not  prinarily  a  phenomenon  of
unregistered firms. Rather. it is one of registered firms selling  a portion of their production informally
and of small labor subcontractors evading regulation."
It is virtually the norm for Brazilian small and medium businesses  to eni  .'i  a considerable
amount of informal activity. This activity  takes two forms. First, to evade sales-related taxes,  goods are
sold without notasfiscais (govemment-mandated sales slips)  or with  notas understating their true value.
Second, because labor regulations  at least double the wage cost of labor,  create substantial liabilitieswith
regard to each worker, and prohibit the reward of individual  productivity,  many firms subcontract for
labor on a piece work basis and/or underreport their wage bills.
Irregularities are often discovered  by government officials in the record-keeping,  reporting, or
labor and safety conditions in individual  firms. Some violations are real, some are artifices of officials'
interpretations of byzantine regulations. and some are the result of direct contradictions between laws
of parallel agencies  or of different levels  of government.'  Officials  have the power to impose  stiff rnes,
and often do. But officials  commonly  use the fines as a stimulus  for a negotiation, in which a settlement
of between 5 and 25% of the fine is paid to them directly. Like eskimos  with regard to snow, Brazilians
have  several  words for these payments,  includingjeitinho,  caixinho,  and 'cafezinho'.3' Some  90% of small
firms, over 70% of medium firms and 60% of large firms acknowledged making these payments, a
surprisingly  high number given the obvious reluctance most people have in admitting illegal activity.
Even so,  the declining  proportion of acknowledged  jeitinhos among  larger firms  provides  added  evidence
that for those who would operate informally,  there is a substantial premium on keeping individual
operations small.
In sum, manageable entry costs, unmanageable formal regulatory costs, and the ubiquitous
jeitinho work together to induce Brazilian  firms to formally  register, but to operate a portion of their
businesses informally.  Absent regulatory discretion, the jeitinho would lcse its role as lubricant of16
business transactions, But, given the complexity  of regulations, in the absence of the jeitinho Brazilian
firms  would be forced to abandon their semi-formal  practices,  and choose between operating as purely
formal ventures or exiting. Given the quagmire of Brazil's formal regulatory environmen.t,  under those
circumstances many,  perhaps most, would choose to exit.
4. BUSINESS-BUSINESS  TRANSACIIONS
Transactions between businesses  also depend on the law  and its enforcement. Legal formalism
might guide  us to an examination  of civil  law affecting  contracts and conflict  resolution: transparent law
and effective legal conflict resolution mechanisms seem essential to efficient exchange.  If laws are
unclear and conflict resolution mechanisms  slow, expensive,  unfair or unpredictable, it may be harder
for businesses  to deal with each other. In particular, effective legal institutions  would seem to facilitate
impersonal transactions: trust or personal ties are not needed if there are sure and swift means to
enforce contracts.'  In this ideal, firms are freed to pursue the most profitable transactions, and all
competitors are treated equally. Otherwise, firms committing  resources to a transaction may  be subject
to the opportunistic behavior of their trading partners -- such as renegotiation of the terms of the
exchange or failure to pay after delivery  of goods.
Yet, where perfect legal institutions do not exist,  and substitutes exist,  how do we evaluate the
adequacy  of these substitutes and the urgency  of reform? To provide  some initial insights,  we apply the
NIE approach to two types of transactions: the placing of orders, and the provision of credit, by the
parties to business  transactions.
Orders. Producing goods against orders requires either guarantees or trust.  A producer must
commit time and resources to the production of an order. The more specialized the order, the harder
it would be to sell to another customer, the greater would be the loss to the supplier if the orderer
cancels or renegotiates once production is complete.  If the good is customized to the needs of a
particular customer (imagine, for example, a thousand pink and orange polo shirts with "Rafael's
Pizzeria"  embroidered on the pocket) without first receiving  full payment, the supplier may  be left in a
disadvantageous  position if the order does not constitute an enforceable contract: the product has little
value to any other customer.  On the other hand, delays in delivery or deviations from product17
specifications  can hart the retailer  or customer  (imagine  the shop  receiving  heavywool  suits  just in time
for spring).
In both Brazil  and Chile.  orders  for garments  have  no legal  status. Yet the consequences  are
quite different. In Brazil,  garment  orders are not secure -- price and quantity  are suibject  to being
renegotiated  until delivery  has been made and signed  for. Figure  4 shows  that renegotiation  is quite
common  in Sao Paulo and, in periods of economic  crisis,  virtually  the norm.  Whereas  in normal
economic  times (although  some respondents  denied the premise that such times  exist), customers
renegotiate  between  six and eight percent of contracts,  in times of crisis  (defined  by respondents  as
coinciding  with  new  government  economic  plans),  35-45%  of orders  are renegotiated  once the order  is
ready  for delivery. By  contrast.  in Chile,  only about two percent of sales are renegotiated,  with  no
reports  of recent "crises"  or sudden  surges  in renegotiation.
Where contracts are insecure,  firms  are less likely  to commit  large amounts  of assets to a
particular  order. They  may,  instead.  adopt alternative  sales  strategies,  such  as:
*  producing  non-customized  items  and  selling  from  stock  aod/or  acceptingorders  only  for
non-customized  items;
i*  reducing  the size  of orders  (or value of orders)  to any  one customer  to diversify  risk;
and/or
vertically  inte rating -- producing  for their own shops to avoid the risk of sour
transactions.  this last  option represents  the substitution  of a hierarchy  for a market.
A look at method  of sales  in Brazil  and Chile  suggests  that firms  are adopting  at least the first
two  of these  strategies  in response  to Brazil's  less  reliable  orders. Brazilian  firms  in  our sample,  overall,
sell 42% of their goods on order from  domestic  customers,  44% from stock, 12%  directly  to retail
customers,  and  2% as exports.  By  comparison,  Chilean  retailers  sell  50%  on domestic  order,  21%  from
stock,  24%  directly  to retail  customers  and 5% as  exports. If we assume  that export  sales  are on order
and that sales to customers  are from  stock.  then Sao Paulo's  garment  producers  sell  46%  on order as
compared  to Chile's  55%,  a moderate  difference.  Clearly,  trade  (and other) policies  of the two  nations
are different,  and one cannot  conclude  a causal  link  between  Brazil's  lower  reliance  on orders  and its
institutional  environment,  but the pattern predicted  by an inferior  contracting  environment  is  there
Furthermore,  in Brazil,  many  firms  have  adopted  a strategy  of accepting  only  smail  orders,  to
diversify  risk. Brazilian  firms  make  an average  of 22%  of their sales  to their  top three customers,  while!  i  '
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Chilean firms  make 34% of their sales to their top trio. More strikingly,  Brazilian  firms  have, on average,
more customers than Chilean firms (even more surprising given that there are more small firms in the
Brazilian  sample):  1289  for Brazil-an  firms versus 242 for Chilean firms.'l
The data provide no support for the proposition that Brazilian firms use vertical integration as
an important response to unreliable orders. Specifically,  a substantially  smaller percentage of Brazilian
respondents (39%) than Chilean respondents (81  %) retailed any portion of their product directly  to the
customer. But we do have reason to suspect that the trend in Brazil is upward: about a fifth  of the firms
expressed  an intention to establish  or expand  existing  retail  sales outlets. By  contrast, in Chile, therewas
some indication  of a decline in retailing activity  among medium and large firms.<
One  final indicator of a  better  contracting environment in Chile  is the  higher level of
customization  of inputs. Specifically,  in Sao Paulo. garment firms report that 21% of the textiles  they
purchase are made to their specifications,  while  in Chile, 33% of fabrics  are reportedlyexclusive  to their
firms. For large firms in Chile, the figure rises to 45% of their inputs.
The unre  ale nature of orders in Brazil is the outcome of an unstable economic environment.
Clearly, the contracting mechanism  used in orders is weak, but it is a weakness mutually  consented to
by buyer and seller and not a result of a malfunctioning  court system. Lawyers informed us that it is
perfectly possible to write a binding  contract for an order, citing the example  of orders for cars. Some
garment producers candidly  acknowledged  that they renegotiate contracts more often than customers,
due to unforeseen shifts in the price of their supplies. And older producers recalled that, before the age
of extreme inflation, contracts were more secure and renegotiation uncommon. Furthermore, orders
are no more legally  binding in Chile than in Brazil,  yet they are, by comparison, rarely renegotiated.
Figure 4 makes clear that the differences between Brazilian firms of different sizes, or even
between Braziliarn  and Chilean firms, pale in comparison with the differences for all Brazilian  firms
between periods of intense government  economic  intervention (including  freezing assets  and prices)  and
normal times. Rapid  and unstable inflation  makes  agreement difficult  at all times,  yet it is  sudden shocks
in prices and contract values,  resulting from government  economic policies  and the government's  direct
manipulation  of the value of contracts, that appear to have undermined secure contracting. 4 One index
of govemment bond  rates used by many firms recently ceased to  be  issued, suppressed by the19
government to discourage  indexation. Furthermore, the government has actively  intervened to mandate
re-indexation of contracted prices. Finally,  the government has acted at times to freeze prices andior
assets, undermining agreements and altering values. Some manufacturers lost nearly all their orders
when the government froze bank accounts, as their customers simply could not  pay them.  The
government leaves firms with little alternative but to rer.awin  as flexible  and uncommitted as possible.
Sales with Credit In both Brazil  and Chile, there is a sense that the garment trade would grind
to a halt without credit. Retailers cannot pay manufacturers  until clot%iing  is  sold; manufacturers cannot
pay textile  suppliers until they are paid for their product. A formal legal  perspective  suggests  that formal
procedures should be developed to facilitate  credit transactions and resolve  conflicts  over debt. Yet, in
the garment business,  transactions are small and even an efficient formal conflict  resolution mechanism
is  likely  to be costly  (recall Williamson,  above). Where resort to court is  expensive  and time consuming,'4
do films nonetheless extend credit?
The answer in Sao Paulo's garment sector is "yes." Transactions involving sales with credit
demonstrate an important institution: an effective information system,  which places a premium on an
untarnished reputation, largely  obviates the need for effecLive  enforcement mechanisms  in the case of
default.  We were, quite frankly. surprised by the readiness of firns to  offer credit to new
customers and the dominance of supplier credit as a source 6f working capital. For example, eighty-
seven percent of respondents give credit to new customers. Small firms are the most likely to request
cash payment on the first transaction, yet only 18% of our sample made this their practice. More
generally,  85% of garment sales in Sao Paulo are made with credit -- including  77% of the sales of small
firms,  94% for medium firms and 96% for large ones. As the following  paragraphs detail, the ability  of
Brazilian  firms to give  credit with reasonable confidence that they will  be repaid arises from an exante
information  system more than from e&post  enforcement mechanisms.
Credit  is extended  in  two major ways in  Brazil:  through duplicatas -- signed invoices
acknowledging  receipt of goods. and through post-dated checks. Larger businesses  accept post-dated
checks only from retail customers,  while  smaller businesses  mayoccasionally  accept them from retailers
as well. The duplicata, the dominant mode for extending credit in this context, is a legally  respectedPercent  of Enterprses  Using  Practice  Percent  of  Enterprises  using  Practice
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document that can be used to obtain credit from banks (although the person who brings the duplicata
to a bank for rediscounting, not the issuer, is liable for the loan).
As Figure 5 shows, firms  extw  nding credit to new customers check on them in two major ways:
through references and through credit agencies. Each has its costs - the time to check oneself or the
fee of a credit agency. Sao Paulo has one major credit agency for checks, Telecheque, and several
specializedagencies  providingrecords  forotherformsofcommercialcredit. The informationisgenerally
up to date and can be obtained nearly instantly by phone or computer terminal.
In normal times, about 8% of customers that  receive credit fail to pay on time, with the
proportion rising to over 27% in terms of economic crisis. Patterns of recourse for unpaid debts are
similar for duplicatas and for post-dated cheques; here we  describe those relating to the duplicata. If
a duplicata is not paid on time. it can either be negotiated and settled between buyer and seller or
referred  to publicly  sanctioned offices  (cartorios).' About half of the cases  of late payment are resolved
through negotiation, while the other half go on to the cartorio.  The cartorio publishes a list of both
those  buyers  who wait to pay in this office (a common and not very  serious offence) and those who fail
to pay  even then (a relatively  serious. though non-criminal  offense). Private credit agencies record and
disseminate  this information to subscribing  firms,  allowing  them toexamine the recordofnewcustomers.
As Table 3 shows, these collection and information institutions obviate the need for frequent resort to
conflict  resolution over credit: about 93% of those with overdue debts pay in the cartorio (within  about
10 days). A retailer with a record of unpaid debts is unlikely  to be able to find suppliers, so most pay to
preserve her reputation.  Among those that fail to pay even the cartorio, negotiation remains the
dominate  mode of resolution; Table 3 confirms that only a small fraction even of these cases (one tenth
of one percent of all transactions involving  d&icatas) end up in court. Those that did involved legal
proceedings  from a low of four months up to three years.4
In spite of Brazil's  effective  alternatives to formal  legal resolution of debts, Table 3 suggests  that
Chile's formal and informal mechanisms are superior.  Fewer people pay late, aLd an even smaller
percentage go to court. Yet the similarities  are more striking  than the differences. In Chile, as in Brazil.
two mechanisms  are used for credit: the post-dated check and the lera (the equivalent of the Brazilian
duplicata). Post-dated checks, in Chile, are taken quite seriously. Whereas in Brazil,  bad checks may21
TABLE  4:  RESOLUTION  OF LATE PAYMENT  OF DEBT
BRAZIL  CHILE
("normal  times")  (all  times)
X of Total  Duplicatas  Checks  Letras
X Pay  Late  8  Z  4  X  3  X
X Pay Late  and  Reported  4  X  .72X  .97X
X Pd Late,  Reported  and  Not Pay  .28X  .24X  .13X
X  of Total  in Lawsuit  .10  .05X  .021
eventually  result  in  the  loss of  a  person's  check-writing  privileges,  in Chile,  bad  checks  will  land  the
writer  in jail.  Within  one  to three  months,  the  writer  who  has  not  made  good  her  bad  check  will end  up
in jail,  through  a quick  criminal  law proceeding  that  requires  only the  returned  check  as evidence.  Thus
post-dated  checks  are  widely  accepted.  accounting  for  39%  of  sales  for  small  firms  and  30%  of  sales
overall.
Letras,  the  Chilean  equivalent  of the  duplicata,  are employed  in some  40%  of sales.  Large  firGm
are  the  most  dependent  on letras -- which  pay for 59%  of their  sales.  The  penalty  for unpaid  letras  is less
severe  than  for  post-dated  cheques,  since  they  are  enforceable  through  civil,  not  criminal  statutes
Nonetheless,  an  effective  information  system  -- which  (as in Brazil)  combines  both  a  reporting  system
on unpaid  debts,  and  credit  agencies  which  transmit  the information  to firms -- assures  payment  of letras:
only  3%  are  paid  late;  and  only  0.02%  of  transactions  involving  letras  wind  up in court.
In sum,  the  comparison  of  Brazil  and  Chile  suggests  that  courts  are  only  a small  part  of  the  set
of institutions  that  facilitates  the  flow of short-term  credit.  Brazilian  legal  processes  have  the  reputation
of being  expensive,  slow and  unpredictable,  whereas  Chile's  courts  are reputed  to be relatively  swift and
consistent  in their  judgments.  Consistent  with  these  differences,  problems  associated  with repayment  of
debt  are somewhat  fewer  in Chile  than  Brazil.  Yet,  with  85%  of garment  sales  made  on credit,  Brazil's
cumbersome  legal system  hardly can  be described  as a deterrent  to the  provision  of short-term  financing
among  firms.  For  this  type  of  financing,  formal  conflict  resolution  mechanisms  do  not  appear  to be  the
most  relevant  institutions.  A full understanding  requires  attention  to institutions  that  are  not part  of the
formal  legal  system:  the  informational  and  reputational  system  that  allows  firms  to extend  credit.22
5. OBSTACLES TO GROWTH:  WHAT ARE THE BINDING CONSTRAINTS?
Both Brazilian  and Chilean garment firms  reported that they intend to grow  substantially  during
the next two years. and it is important to their economies and to employment (given the high labor
intensity of the industry) that they do so.  in an economy and society like Brazil's, the agenda for
economic  reform is broad and far exceeds the govermment's  capacity to address in the short term. How,
then, should we rank possible  legal and regulatory reforms against  other reforms that may  consume the
time, energy  and political  capital of a reform-minded  government? Which  constraints are binding,  which
merely a nuisance?
Here, looking at formal law gives  us little guidance. Clearly, many  laws,  enforcement practices
and conflict resolution mechanisms can stand improvement, but what guidance does the Law and
Development approach give us about where to start?  An NIE approach, however, directs us to the
actual experiences and priorities of businesses."
To this end, we asked Brazilian  garment entrepreneurs to rate various obstacles to growth and
future operation on a 1 to 5 scale. In doing so, they revealed a clear and sobering picture of their most
serious obstacles to growth, particularly sobering to those who would target legal reform.  Figure 6
presents the average, normalized (on a scale of zero to one) evaluation by entrepreneurs of a list of
obstacles  to future operation and growth that we offered them. The obstacles  they find the most serious
are not those directly  related to legal and regulatory institutional reform, but rather those pertaining to
overall economic management. The three factors seen as the greatest obstacles to reform are policy
uncertainty, price instability  and inflation,  and the high level  of taxes. A second tier of obstacles relates
to tax  bureaucracy  and labor regulation. Respondents placed obstacles  related to the formal legal  system
and formal conflict  resolution (e.g. renegotiated contracts, payment arrears and debts owed) at the end
of a long list of complaints. Our research makes clear that reform of formal legal systems  and formal
conflict  resolution mechanisms  were not priority obstacles for garment firms.
In sharp contrast, Chilean respondents did not identify any group of obstacles with equal
unanimity  or fervor. Policy-related  variables  did not stand out -- the single  greatest obstacle identified
was the lack of competent workers. Political  uncertainty did rank second, most likely  due to the recent
transition to democratic government. While rankings,  like  personal utilities,  cannot be compared acrossLevel  of Difficulty  Level  of Difficulty
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nations, it was  striking that Chileans  systematically  chose lower average rankings than Brazilians  (even
after normalization,  due to the high number of zero rankings). Chilean responses are more clustered,
implying  that no great common problem elicits a consensus response. Only Brazilian entrepreneurs,
motivated by common frustration with government policy, lay out a distinct and clear sequence for
reform.
6. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Over the past five  years or so, development analysts  and practitioncrs have begun to turn their
attention  to  the institutions that underpin development, and have initiated reforms of legal and
regulatory institutions that are intended to strengthen the enabling environment for efficient, private
sector led growth. However, the reform agenda has thus far been driven more by an ex ante perception
that  efficient institutional  arrangements should resemble  rational  Westem  norms of  law and
jurisprudence than by empirical assessments of what in practice are the costs to  private firms of
institutional shortfalls. The goal  of the research reported in this paper was  to strengthen the empirical
foundations for legal and regulatory reform. Four principal  conclusions  emerge.
First, the institutions and  practices that  provide the foundation for business transactions
encompass very much more than the formal, public institutions that are usually  the targets of scrutiny
and reform. The comparative analvsis  reveals  a Brazilian  system considerably  more difficult  in practice
than that of Chile, yet considerably less difficult  than written law and formal procedure would imply.
Brazilian firms have found surprisingly effective substitutes for the lack of efficient regulation and
inexpensive formal conflict resolution -- a pattern consistent with Alexander Gerschenkron's classic
proposition that developing countries invent institutional substitutes for arrangements prevailing in
developed countries.48  Thus Sao Paulo's multi-staged,  complex  formal process of entry (much like the
one described for Lima by Hernando de Soto) tumed out in practice to be a one stop, simple process  for
the average new business.  one in which  work of accountants and despachantes in large part substitutes
for (the absence of) an efficient formal  system of entry.  Similarly,  credit information and the need to
maintain one's reputation to stay in business act as reasonable substitutes for quick and cheap formal
conflict  resolution mechanisms. Further, in the garment industry,  firms have been able to adopt flexible24
production and marketing strategies -- producing non-customized  items, and diversifying  risk by having
many  customers  each with small orders -- to address the unpredictable environment for contracting. In
this sense, entrepreneurial  flexibility  substitutes for formal mechanisms through which buyers and
producers could commit  themselves to firm  orders at a pre-agreed price. As the comparison  with Chile
confirms, institutional substitutes do  not  fully compensate for  the  difficult legal and  regulatory
environment for business  transactions. But theydo allowasurprisinglyvibrant andcompetitive industry
to operate  -- albeit one where a substantial fraction of transactions take place outside the formal
economy.
Second, the results strongly suggest that, at least in Brazil, legal institutional reform, while
ultimately  important to attaining the full potential of the economy, can wait for the resolution of more
urgent and binding constraints to private sector development.  One clear result of our survey is that,
above all, Sao Paulo's garment entrepreneurs entrepreneurs seek a more stable political economy  and
lower taxes. Indeed, responses highlighted the cost of macro-instability  to micro-efficiency  and the
security of property rights.
Third, even though institutional substitutes help smooth over the rough edges of Brazil's
cumbersome formal institutions, and even though macroeconomic policy  clearly emerges as the most
binding constraint on enterprises, our  research has nonetheless identified an urgent agenda for
regulatory reform. To be sure, not all regulation weighs equally on garment firms: the burden of red
tape at entry, for example, appears small, as does the burden imposed by cumbersome formal legal
institutions. Rather, the two areas that appear most important to Brazilian  firms are those regulations
relating to taxes and labor.  The laws are complex, hard to know, expensive to comply with, and
sometimes arbitrarily enforced. Nor does the burden of these regulations fall equally on all firms: the
evidence suggests that large incumbents, while not protected from the entry of competitors, may be
modestly  protected from these competitors becoming  large by  the substantial threshold burden imposed
by tax and labor regulation as firms grow. This "insider-outsider' pattern limits the potential of new
entrepreneurial talent to contribute to the development of the Brazilian  economy.
Finally,  the research implicitly  suggests  that proponents of legal reform could strengthen their
case by identifying  more precisely  which business activities are most burdened by a weak formal legal25
system. Our research suggests  that Brazil's  legal system  and complementary  institutional arrangements
were adequate forspot transactions,  and transactions which  requiredshort-termcommitments, and those
which did not involve  transaction-specific  investments. What is less clear -- and what we could  not learn
from the garment industry (where transaction-specific investments are relatively unimportant) - is
whether Brazil's institutional arrangements are adequate for firms to commit assets to production
specific to another firm; any inability  to commit resources to long-term ipter-firm relationships could
undermine the dynamism  of private sector development.  In Sao Paulo, the ability to commit  clearly
suffered from the unpredictable rate of inflation. But even with a stable macro-economy,  Brazil's  legal
system might well turn out  to be inadequate for long-term commtiments.  This implies a need for
research of sectors where technology is more specialized.26
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2. This "ideal"  would clearly  depend on social goals for income distribution and other merit goods.
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farmer." Ibrahim Shihata. "Law  and the Development Process" Bank's World March, 1990 p. 12
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institutional economics."  James  1). Hess.  A  Comparison of Altemative Approaches to Economic
Organization  -- Comment Journal of International and Theoretical Economics 146  (1990), p. 74
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19. Peter Evans Dependent Develonment:  the Alliance  of Multinational.  State. and Local  Capital  in
Brazil. (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  1979).  For more  radical  analysis,  see Michael  Storper.
Whofienefitsfomlnd  istrialDecenalization?  SocialPowerin  theL-aborMaA4  IncomeDisuuibudonand
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clothing  and  shoes,  food  products  (with  the exception  of flour  milDing),  leather  products,  beverages  and
other consumer  goods."  p. 25
25. A  definitional  difference  led  one firm  of 500  employees  in the Chile  sample  to be classified  as  "large"
and  one firm  of 100  employees  to be classified  as "medium."  In the Brazil  firm,  while  there are no firms
of exactly  500  employees,  there is  one with 100  that is classified  as 'sm. U.'
26. The typical  interview  took  place  in an office  in the firm  itself.  A small  coffee  was  inevitably  offered,
and the authors  thank all the respondents  for their  hospitality.
27. One fact  became  clear  from  both  the Brazil  and Chile  surveys:  a strong  association  between  age  and
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costing  $180. Of eighteen  firms  responding,  10  took one month  or less  to register.29
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kno ving  the legal requirements and administrative  procedures for obtaining permrits.  Informally,  their
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31. Larger firms  were inclined  to object more to Federal tax  agencies, while  smaller firms concentrated
on State tax authorities (ICMS).  Complaints about labor regulations were common among all firms.
Firms manufacturing garments under license from a foreign company complained about the difficult
process of obtaining trademark from the Federal Agency VI.  Irademark  infringement is generally
addressed through lawyers  and courts, hence trademark protection can be quite expensive.
32. The difference is more dramatic, but the data less sound, if one includes large firms, where one
Brazilian  firm  reported using 510  staff for bureaucratic compliance requirements and another reported
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33. Tis  suggests  that formal mechanisms  may  work reasonably  welL Perhbps the high level of conflict
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34. Nonetheless,propinas and the coimas were not unfamiliar concepts to Chilean entrepreneurs.
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36. Levy [19911  uses a similar framework  to anaiyze in detail interactions among  the threshold burden,
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39. meaning  "little  fix,"  "collection  box",  and "small  coffee",  respectively.  A  blunter  word,propina,  means
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cartorio  is the tabelionatos  deprotesto de mudos.  where  bad  debts  and bad checks  can be protested".
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47. Levy  (Ibid.)  discusses  in detail the methodology  used here.
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Perspective:  A Book  of Essays  (Cambridge,  Mass.: The Belknap  Press  of Harvard  University  Press,
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